Montana Law Review
Volume 27
Issue 1 Fall 1965

Article 1

July 1965

Problems Arising Out of Montana's Law of Water Rights
Albert W. Stone
Professor of Law, Montana State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Albert W. Stone, Problems Arising Out of Montana's Law of Water Rights, 27 Mont. L. Rev. (1965).
Available at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol27/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Montana Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at University of Montana.
For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

Stone: Problems Arising Out of Montana's Law of Water Rights

Problems Arising Out of Montana's Law of Water Rights*
Albert W. Stone**
The water which originates in the snowpacks of Montana's mountains
is used by all of the states through which flow the Missouri River and the
tributaries of the Columbia River. The more populous and industrious
downstream states on these drainages are rapidly increasing their need,
their demand-and their claim to these waters. And lately serious consideration has been given to diverting water out of these drainages to
more southerly states which have developed a need.
Meanwhile Montana is limited in developing her water resources by
laws and administrative patterns which were formed before Montana became a state. No law enables Montana to develop multi-purpose projects,
or to give recognition, and thereby lay the basis for a claim, to some of
the uses of water which do not entail storage or diversion. Neither is the
public interest represented in the development of new uses or applications
of water in Montana.
Montanans who are concerned with the water resources of the state
are aware of the need for improving the legal and institutional structure
to fully utilize existing waters. An example of that concern is Senate
Joint Resolution No. 13 of the 1965 legislature, which directs the Legislative Council to examine the feasibility of authorizing the formation of
Water Conservancy Districts enabling Montanans to develop multipurpose water resources projects. That Resolution is the forerunner of
many changes which inevitably must be made in our laws and our administration of water resources.
Such changes must be made on the basis of an understanding of the
problems in this area. This paper deals with a small group of these problems concerning our water resources: the problems arising out of Montana's law of water rights.
ACQUISITION OF A WATER RIGHT
"Use" Rights
A "use" rights is an appropriation upon an unadjudicated stream,
acquired by merely using the water-without posting, filing, declaring
or stating anything.' Such use of the water may be corroborated by the
*This paper was prepared under the auspices of the Montana University Joint
WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH CENTER which granted funds to support the
research under the Water Resources Research Act of 1964. (P.L. 88-379, July 17,
1964, 2nd Sess., 88th Cong.)
**Professor of Law, Montana State University. Member of the California Bar. B.A.,

University of California, 1943; LL.B. i Duke .University, 1948.
'This method originated simply by use, before any enactments concerning methods
of appropriation. Apparently, even in the absence of a statute, it was not uncommon
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physical evidence of diversion works. Examples of such works are a headgate and ditch, or an electric pump, outfall pipe and sprinklers. But
eventually all of the facts concerning such an appropriation will have to
be established, and that will require litigation with other water users.
The "proof" will be by means of parole testimony based upon recollection
which bears upon the priority date, amount, purpose, place and periods
2
of use.
Thus, a "use" right is an existing but indeterminate right, with its
actual ascertainment and establishment postponed to future litigation.3
The longer the litigation is postponed, the more vagaries and uncertainties will creep into the ascertainment and establishment process. During
the interim, a "use" right is a fragile and uncertain property to own,
while for other appropriators it represents an uncertain and unascertained
threat which may inhibit investment and development of the watercourse.
These effects of "use" rights are not in the interest of the owner,
other local interests, or the public which has an interest both in knowledge
of the uses of a public resource and in its full development. This method
4
of acquiring a water right should not be permitted in the future.
for persons to post a notice of appropriation. That was done in Woolman v. Garringer, 1 Mont. 535 (1872), and the appropriator was held to have an appropriation
as of the date of posting, which was in 1866. Where the appropriator did not post
a notice, his appropriation "related back" to the date of commencement of work
on the appropriation. Wright v. Cruse, 37 Mont. 177, 95 Pac. 370 (1908); Maynard
v. Watkins, 55 Mont. 54, 173 Pac. 551 (1918).
After statutes providing for posting and filing with the county clerks were
enacted, failure to comply with the statutes did not prevent a person from acquiring
an appropriation, but merely prevented his right from relating back to a date
earlier than his date of completion and putting the water to a beneficial use.
Murray v. Tingley, 20 Mont. 260, 50 Pac. 723 (1897). The statutes referred to
were enacted in 1885, and are now in REvIsao CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, §§ 89-810
to 89-814. (The REVISED CODES OF MONTANA will henceforth be cited R.C.M. 1947.)
Murray v. Tingley, supra is still the law on this point. Clausen v. Armington, 123
Mont. 1, 212 P.2d 440 (1949); Midkiff v. Kincheloe, 127 Mont. 324, 263 P.2d 976
(1953).
These water-right cases are peculiar in their nature, in that the parties are obliged to
depend to so great an extent upon the memories of those who came to a new country
in the early days.... The testimony is voluminous, covering almost 1.000 printed pages.

We have examined it with great care and see no good reason for quoting it here.
There are c ntradictions of the testimony offered by both parties. Many mistakes and
inaccuracies are apparent on both sides, but there is no reason to believe that any
witness wilfully testified falsely.
These water rights were initiated a quarter

of a century ago,

and

there

is

occasion for little wonder that the witnesses should not agree in their memories as to
details. ..
Wright v. Cruse, 37 Mont. 177, 180-81, 95 Pac. 370, 371-72 (1908);
But. as every appropriation must be made for a beneficial or useful purpose (section
1881, CIVIL CODE), it becomes the duty of the courts to try the question of the
claimant's intent by his acts and the circumstances surrounding his possession of the
water, its actual or contemplated use and the purposes thereof.
Toohey v. Campbell, 24 Mont. 13, 17-18, 60 Pac. 396 (1900).
Other cases are illustrative of the difficulty, uncertainty and lack of trustworthiness of this process, e.g. Gilcrest v. Bowen, 95 Mont. 44, 24 P.2d 141 (1933) ;
Geary v. Harper, 92 Mont. 242, 12 P.2d 276 (1932); St. Onge v. Blakely, 76 Mont.
1, 245 Pac. 532 (1926); Allen v. Petrick, 69 Mont. 373, 222 Pac. 451 (1924);
Controw v. Huffine, 48 Mont. 437, 138 Pac. 1094 (1914); Hilger v. Sieben, 38 Mont.
93, 98 Pac. 881 (1909); Sayre v. Johnson, 33 Mont. 15, 81 Pa. 389 (1905).
'See cases cited, note 2 supra. On any stream in which it makes any difference how
much water the various appropriators are entitled to, there must ultimately be
litigation. That is because litigation is the only method extant whereby water rights
may be determined.
'A possible exception is the use of water by the public. "What is everyone's business
is no-one's business "I and so uses by the general public are quite naturally unrecorded. 2
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol27/iss1/1
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The "Statutory Method" of Appropriation on Unadjudicated Streams
This procedure for making an appropriation on an unadjudicated
stream was enacted in 1885, in an attempt to provide a simple substitute
5
for the "use" right, and possibly was intended to abolish "use" rights.
At the least, it was intended to cause water rights to be placed on record,
both for the security of the appropriator and for the benefit of others
who might desire to invest in subsequent appropriations and who would
need to know the, nature of prior rights to which new appropriations
would be subject.
The statutory procedure requires the posting of a notice at the point
of intended diversion, and, within twenty days thereafter, filing a notice
of appropriation with the county clerk. 6 These notices must describe the
intentions of the would-be appropriator with regard to the quantity of
water claimed, the purpose of the intended use, the means of diversion,
the date, the name of the appropriator, and a description of the point of
diversion.7 Within forty days after the original posting of the notice, the
appropriator must proceed with reasonable diligence toward the completion of his appropriation.8
But this is an insufficient improvement over the "use" right. All of
the records required by this filing procedure are created before any diversion is commenced and before the water is put to a beneficial use. So,
if a person posts and files in accordance with the statutory method, and
then changes his mind and proceeds no further, he leaves a record in the
county clerk's office of an appropriation being made, while in fact there
is none.
And even if a person goes ahead and completes an appropriation, it
is natural for him to be on the "safe side" by filing for plenty of water.
After all, he had to file before he commenced either his diversion work
or his use. 9 Typically, Montana appropriators file claims to much more
water than they need or can use-even to more water than is available in
the stream, in some cases. 10 But the filing for an excessive claim does not
produce a water right greater than a person finally put to an efficient
But some of those uses are of great importance and should be recognized. The
recreation industry in Montana is largely based upon the public's beneficial use of
water.
5
R.C.M. 1947, §§ 89-810 to 89-814. Section 89-812 states: "A failure to comply with
the provisions of this chapter deprives the appropriator of the right to the use of
water as against a subsequent claimant who complies therewith, but by complying
with the provisions of this chapter the right to the use of the water shall relate
back to the date of posting the notice." But in Murray v. Tingley, supra note 1,
the court held that failure to comply with the statute does not deprive an appropriator
of his right to water; it simply deprives him of his right to relate his date of
appropriation back to the commencement of his works. Thus "use" rights survived
these enactments.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 89-810.
7Ibid.
8
R.C.M. 1947, § 89-811.
QSee statutes cited aupra note 5.
"See the classic discussion of this in Allen v. Petrick, supra note
Published
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beneficial use." It result only in an erroneous and largely useless record
filed with the county clerk.
In making his county-by-county survey of water use, the State Engineer spoke of how little value there was in researching these filings:
About the only result one will accomplish by such a research wi11 be
a tabulation of the dates of filing. The amount of water filed on will
be of no consequence, there is no conclusive evidence that the recorded appropriations have been perfected, and there is no record of
the rights which are being used but never recorded. Therefore, a purchaser of ranch property, where he has to depend upon irrigation
from a stream that is not adjudicated, has no way of determining
the validity or priority of his water right. He has no assurance of the
value of the right until the stream is adjudicated by the court,
when
each claimant must prove his claim by material witnesses. 12
Thus, the statutory system leads to needless and endless litigation because of the same inadequacies which are inherent in "use" rights. Even
worse, it results in the filing of distorted, self-serving notices of appropriation which become a prima facie threat to others who might desire
to invest in water using activities, 13 while at the same time the statutory
system does not lead to the security of an established quantity of water
for the owner.
One improvement upon this system which could easily be made would
be to require the filing of a notice of completion of an appropriation,
stating how much water was actually diverted, and what the actual use
of that water was.
But even that modification would not be a sufficient improvement in
the administration of the use of Montana's waters. As the waters of the
state become more fully utilized, necessarily there will be less available
to commit to future uses and future purposes. There is a need to assure
that the diminishing reserves are wisely allocated to the most beneficial
future uses, and also to assure that existing uses are not jeopardized by
overappropriation of the sources of supply.
The Constitution of Montana provides that a water right is a franchise, granted by the state, to permit an individual to put a public resource to a publicly beneficial use. 14 The public's stake in the efficiency
and desirability of future uses of this public property requires that the
public be represented and that future appropriations be approved in
advance. Future rights should also be both definite and easy for subsequent appropriators to ascertain. To accomplish these purposes, a modern water law code should require that the permission of a public representative, such as a state engineer or a water board, be obtained in the
making of future appropriations.' 5
uConrow v. Huffine, supra note 2; Quigley v. McIntosh, 110 Mont. 495, 103 P.2d
1067 (1940).
STATE ENGINEER'S

2
1

OFFICE, WATER RESOURCES

SURVEY,

MADISON

COUNTY

MONTANA

1 (1954).
I3R.C.M. 1947, § 89-814.
"MONT. CONST. art. III, § 15.
15Developments in other states are set forth in Part II of this work, by Jon A. Hudak. 4
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol27/iss1/1
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The Exclusive Method of Appropriating from Adjudicated Streams
Once an adjudication of rights among appropriators or claimants of
the waters of a watercourse has been made, subsequent appropriations
must comply with the exclusive method of appropriating which is provided by statute. 16 That method entails the filing of a petition with the
clerk of the court in the county where the appropriation is to be made,
stating the factual details concerning the means of appropriation. The
petition must be accompanied by either a map prepared by an engineer,
or an aerial photograph, showing the location of the works. The appropriator names himself as plaintiff. All other appropriators or claimants
to the source of supply are made defendants in what amounts to an adversary proceeding: a water-rights suit. 1'7 A summons is issued and served
upon each of the "defendants," and the trial results in a decree.' 8
The only means whereby a person can make an appropriation upon
an adjudicated stream, is to involve himself and everyone else along that
stream in another lawsuit. Such a cumbersome and costly procedure
should not be imposed upon either the prior claimants or the new appro7
priator. Nor should the district judges be burdened with the minutia
of determining and then forever after administering the rights in a stream
system. 19 A simpler, cheaper and more efficient means should be substituted. Inevitably, Montana must adopt an administrative system, under
which only one means of appropriation can 20exist, regardless of whether
the stream has previously been adjudicated.
Acquisition by Purchase
At the time of the original acquisition of an appropriation, in the
ordinary case a surplus of water in the stream was available for appropriation, and it was in the public interest to put it to some use. Once having been developed, it usually is in the public interest to guaranty security in the investment, and to continue the appropriator's franchise to
the use of water which he has developed.
But it should be kept in mind that all uses of water are public uses,
under the Montana Constitution. 2' Although a water right is frequently
likened to a "property" right, it is not at all similar to the more common
1

R.C.M. 1947, § 89-829 provides the procedure for appropriating waters from an
Section 89-837 states that
adjudicated stream, using the mandatory word "shall."
of the right to use any water as
a failure to comply deprives the "appropriator"
against any subsequent 'person who does comply. In Donich v. Johnson, 77 Mont.
229, 250 Pae. 963 (1926) it was held that this statutory method was the exclusive
method of appropriating from adjudicated streams. (Laws of Montana 1921, ch.
228.) That case is also authority that the very similar 1907 statutes (Laws of Montana 1907, ch. 185) were not exclusive.
1
'R.O.M. 1947, § 89-829.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 89-830.
29See discussion infra, entitled "Administration."
See discussion infra, under "Ascertainment of past vested rights-an authoritative
inventory" and "Adjudication or determination of water rights."
uMONT. CONST. art. III, § 15.
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rights in property. For example, a person who has the property interests
in an automobile or a rocking chair, may choose not to use it and to have
it stand idle, or he may choose to have it destroyed. No strong public
interest is violated. But a person with a water right has no such exclusive
control over it. 22 Nor does he own the water to which his right is related. 23 The exercise of a water right affects others who depend upon the
same source of supply. It is an exercise of a public franchise in which
both the public and neighboring appropriators have a vital interest.
Because others have such a vital interest in the use of water, the
severance of a water right from its original purposes, and its application
to different lands and different uses, raises some questions. A likely
reason for the purchase of a water right would be that the source of supply is already fully appropriated, so that there no longer is the surplus
available to additional, or other uses. Since there is no longer a surplus
which ought to be used, the new use for which the right is purchased
cannot be justified on the basis of conditions which existed when the
original appropriation was made. Nor can the new use be justified as the
continued recognition of a franchise which has caused investment in reliance upon its assured recognition in the future.
The purchase of a water right for the purpose of applying the water
to different lands and different uses involves questions of both a public
and a local interest. The public interest requires that a limited water
supply on a fully appropriated stream be applied to the future uses which
are most beneficial to the public. A strictly private purchase and sale will
not assure the accomplishment of such purposes.
The local interest is demonstrated by the frequency with which such
purchases result in a greater, or different demand in quantity of water
24
and duration of flow, to the detriment of existing appropriations.
'The heart of a water right is its priority--a concept which does not apply to the
more familiar and common rights in property.
2Allen v. Petrick, supra note 2, at 377 (222 Pac. at 452) ("The appropriator does
not own the water."); Creek v. Bozeman W.W. Co., 15 Mont. 121, 129, 38 Pac. 459,
461 (1894) ("The right acquired by an appropriator in and to the waters of a
natural running stream is not ownership of a running volume of the dimensions
claimed, like the individual ownership of a chattel, so that it may be transferred
corporally and carried away. . . "'); Anderson v. Cook, 25 Mont. 330, 338, 64 Pac.
873, 876 (1901) ("The parties did not own the water"); Norman v. Corbley,
32 Mont. 195, 202, 79 Pac. 1059, 1060 (1905) ("Neither party could acquire any
title to the corpus of this water, but only to the use thereof"); Verwolf v. Low
Line Irrigation Co., 70 Mont. 570, 578, 227 Pac. 68, 71 (1924) ("By its appropriations the company acquired merely the right to the use of the waters--not a title
to the corpus of the waters ....
"); Custer v. Missoula Public Service Co., 91 Mont.
136, 142, 6 P.2d 131, 133 (1931) ("It is elementary that the appropriator of the
water of a running stream does not own the corpus of the water ....
"); Rock Creek
Ditch & Flume Co. v. Miller, 93 Mont. 248, 258, 17 P.2d 1074, 1076, 89 A.L.R 200,
203 (1933) ("The doctrine that an appropriator does not own the corpus of the
water, but only its use. . .has been announced by this court many times.");
Brennan v. Jones, 101 Mont. 550, 567, 55 P.2d 697, 702 (1936) ("We are committed to the rule that the appropriator of a water right does not own the
water. . . 2'); Sherlock v. Greaves, 106 Mont. 206, 217, 76 P.2d 87, 91 (1938)
(quoting from Brennan v. Jones, supra.)
1B.g., Conrow v. Huffine, upra note 2 (court found that the successors to Moore, the
original appropriator, had expanded the original use and demanded more water than
Moore himself had required); Creek v. Bozeman Water Works Co., supra note 23
(after sale, downstream appropriators were deprived of the return flow); Spokane
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Although the law prohibits changes which will adversely affect other
appropriators, 25 in actual practice such adverse effects quite commonly
occur. 26 For example, the original appropriator might sell an unneeded
portion of his claimed water right. If the purchaser now attempts to usc
the right to the full extent of the original claim, it will involve an extension of the use. If the purpose of his use is different from the original
purpose of the appropriation, in all likelihood the new use will require
taking water at different times of the season, or of the year, or will re27
quire a more constant flow.
In applying the theory of the law to the actual practices of the purchaser of a water right, the courts have introduced uncertainty into the
definition of a water right. In some cases the purchaser does not get
what he paid for, because of judicial limitations placed upon his use as a
result of the ensuing litigation with other appropriators. Thus an irrigator may be prohibited from fully utilizing his appropriation during the
irrigation season, if the original purpose was for mining.28 The purchaser
of a decreed water right may find that he must now litigate to ascertain
how constant a flow, or how intermittent a flow, he is entitled to during
the irrigation season although the right which he purchased from his
predecessor was backed up by a decree which assured a given amount of
miner's inches without any such expressed limitation.29 Or the purchaser
may have to litigate to establish exactly how much water his seller would
have used. The seller would not be permitted to take more than he currently needed, and cannot sell a better right than he himself possessed.80
There should be more security and certainty in the application of
water to different uses, and, at least with respect to streams which no
longer have a surplus of water available, new and different uses of the
water should be made only with the permission of the public through its
representative. It is questionable that a priority should be retained
through such transfers. 3 1

Ranch & Water Co. v. Beatty, 37 Mont. 342, 96 Pac. 727 (1908) (same); Allen v.
Petrick, supra note 2 (defendants were successors to original appropriators, but used
more water than their rights covered); Peck v. Simon, 101 Mont. 12, 52 P.2d 164
(1935) (purchaser changed use from mining to irrigation, resulting in presumed
injury to subsequent appropriator); Galiger v. McNulty, 80 Mont. 339, 260 Pac.
501 (1927) (same, requiring heavier use during the irrigation season than the
original mining appropriation required); Brennan v. Jones, supra note 23 (purchaser
was taking a more constant flow than his seller likely would have required).
-R.C.M. 1947, § 89-803.
"See illustrative cases cited supra note 24.
'Brennan v. Jones, supra note 23, is similar to the illustration used in the text.
Quigley v. McIntosh, 110 Mont. 495, 103 P.2d 1067 (1940) involves the same
elements except that the changes were not the result of a sale.
"Galiger v. MeNulty, supra note 24; Peck v. Simon, supra note 24.
"Brennan v. Jones, supra note 23; Quigley v. McIntosh, supra note 27.
a'Brennan v. Jones, supra note 23.
Chief Justice Callaway suggested such a limitation in Allen v. Petrick, supra note 23,
at 379 (222 Pac. at 453) and at least one early case found that to be -the law, Alder
Gulch Con. Min. Co. v. Hayes, 6 Mont. 31, 9 Pac. 581 (1886).
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Miscellaneous Points Concerning the Acquisition of a Water Right
Appropriationfor a limited time. None of our code provisions suggest
that an appropriation may be for only a part of a week or a season or a
year, or perhaps of only a few years duration if the purpose of the appropriation can be accomplished in a limited time. 32 Such limitations have
been suggested by the courts,3 3 but when they are applied for the first
time in litigation, they are likely to come as a surprise to an appropriator,
and to create uncertainty regarding the security of an appropriation
right.
Access. The language of Prentice v. McKay to the effect that it is
necessary to have an interest in the land which gives access to the water
in order to obtain an appropriation 34 should be replaced by a statute
which clearly severs ditch rights from water rights.3 5 The validity of an
appropriation for a beneficial use should not depend upon whether the
originator of the appropriation was rightfully using the ditch which gave
him access at the time that he appropriated.
Watercourse. It should make no difference, in the appropriation of
water, whether the source of supply is a "watercourse. '36 A person who
has discovered a means of employing vagrant migratory waters which
only occasionally come his way, or of making use of occasional floodwaters, should be protected in his endeavors. Another person should not
be permitted to subsequently interfere and construct means of diverting
such waters for his own beneficial use, and receive legal protection by a
subsequent finding of fact that the waters are not in a "watercourse."
The doctrine of priority of use should apply, and such a change in law
will avoid water rights suits, on intermittent watercourses, which are now
necessary to determine whether the doctrine of prior appropriation gives
37
protection to the water users.
82See generally R.C.M. 1947, §§ 89-801, 89-802.
'Galiger v. McNulty, supra note 24.
"Prentice v. McKay, 38 Mont. 114, 98 Pac. 1081 (1909). This is followed in Jones v.
Hanson, 133 Mont. 115, 125-27, 320 P.2d 1007, 1013-14 (1958).
*5As seems to be the clear implication of Connolly v. Harrel, 102 Mont. 295, 57 P.2d
781 (1936), in which defendants acquired an appropriation by means of a revocable
license which afforded them access to the water.
"In Popham v. Holloran, 84 Mont. 442, 275 Pac. 1099 (1929), the determination of
fdet that the water had attained the status of a "watercourse'
was essential to
protect plaintiff's appropriation. But in Doney v. Beatty, 124 Mont. 41, 220 P.2d 77
(1950) the court denied plaintiff protection for his earlier appropriations and
investments because the defendants were taking water and reservoiring it in an area
where the source of supply was not deemed to be a "watercourse."
The latter
decision could have been based more satisfactorily upon the finding that the water
would not reach plaintiffs in any event.
For the purpose of determining responsibility and liability for flooding a neighbor's basement, or his land, by diverting a flow of water toward him, it may be
useful to distinguish between flood waters or vagrant surface waters, and streams.
In the former case a person may be considered as defending himself against a
"common enemy" and not responsible for the ensuing damage, while in the latter
case he may be considered as the principal cause of the neighbor's plight. See, e.g.,
Fordham v. Northern Pacific Ry., 30 Mont. 421, 76 Pac. 1040 (1904); Le Munyon v.
Gallatin Valley Ry., 60 Mont. 517, 199 Pac. 915 (1921). But that situation is quite
unrelated to the acquisition of a water right.
87
8ee note 36 supra.
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Flood, seepage and waste. Similarly, it should not be necessary to "impound flood, seepage, and waste waters in a reservoir" in order to appropriate them. 8 Although an appropriator probably should not acquire a
right to compel his source of supply to continue to seep or to waste water,
yet, as against a subsequent claimant to that source of supply, his priority
should be sufficient. His means of appropriation should not be specified,
for he can be governed by the usual rules concerning efficiency in diversion and use.
Unifying our laws. Under Montana law prior to the Groundwater Code
groundwaters were probably not a part of the appropriation system, and
that is why the Groundwater Code specifically authorizes their appropriation.3 9 The authorization to appropriate water should be broad and conprehensive, and all such authorizations should be included in one place in
the laws.
ASCERTAINMENT OF PAST VESTED RIGHTSAN AUTHORITATIVE INVENTORY
As pointed out in the preceding discussion, there is no record of a
"use" right.40 An appropriation by the statutory method on an unadjudicated stream results in a self-serving declaration of the amount of water
that the appropriator will require in the future when and if he completes
his appropriation, and is therefore an almost useless record. 41 Even an
adjudicated right may only provide a record which will be found incomplete and therefore uncertain with respect to the amount of water
included. 42 The existing legal system simply does not create security and
certainty in rights, useful records, or an inventory which could be helpful
to other appropriators and to the public administration of the use of
water.
Montana's Code has allowed persons who acquired "use" rights prior
to 1885 to file declarations of their rights. 43 The new Groundwater Code
contains a similar provision. 4 4 Both provisions offer the inducement to
such appropriators, that compliance will result in the declaration being
-R.C.M. 1947, § 89-801.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 89-2912. The inference with respect to the law of groundwater prior
to the Groundwater Code, may be drawn from a scattering of cases which bear
upon that law. Leonard v. Shatzer, 11 Mont. 422, 28 Pac. 457 (1891); Ryan v.
Quinlan, 45 Mont. 521, 124 Pac. 512 (1912); Woodward v. Perkins, 116 Mont. 46,
147 P.2d 1016 (1944); Rock Creek Ditch & Flume Co. v. Miller, supra note 23;
McGowen v. United States, 206 F. Supp. 439 (D. Mont. 1962). It seems questionable
whether Perkins v. Kramer, 121 Mont. 595, 198 P.2d 475 (1948) is consistent with
that assumption, and see Note, A Landowner Has the Right to Intercept Water
Percolating Beneath His Land Even Though it Supplies a Spring Which Another Has
Appropriated, 24 MoN'r. L. REv. 169 (1963).
'See notes 1 and 2 supra.
1
" See note 12, supra.
"See discussion under "Adjudication Or Determination Of Water Rights" infra;
Stone, Are There Any Adjudicated Streams in Montana! 19 MONT. L. REv. 19 (1957).
-R.C.M. 1947, § 89-913.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 89-2913(h).
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taken as prima facie evidence of the statements contained in them. 45
But again, such declarations are self-serving and unreliable. Besides that,
these provisions have not even been effective in inducing water users to
46
make the filing declaration in compliance.
The only inventory of existing Montana water rights of any real
value is the county-by-county survey carried on by the State Engineer's
Office. 47 Such a systematic and careful inventory of water uses should be
continued until the entire state is covered. The chief inadequacy in these
inventories is that they were not given the legal effect which they should
have received. In effect, they amount to a private inventory, and not a
determination of water rights.
The existing inventories made by the State Engineer's Office will be
invaluable in making future administrative determination of present
water rights. Nearly all of the data needed has been compiled for those
counties in which the survey has been completed. There would still need
to be an opportunity for appropriators to file objections, to come and be
heard, and to appeal if they feel unfairly treated. These additional procedural steps should be provided, and should result in a legally final
determination of existing rights, based upon past uses and needs. The
administrative body which conducts the inventory should be given authority to divide large stream systems into practicable administrative units,
both for the purpose of determining rights and for the purpose of admin48
istering them, following Wyoming law in this respect.
In establishing existing uses of water, existing public uses should
not be overlooked. Such uses may not require a diversion of water, and
therefore may not be apparent to the surveyor. 49 For example, the use by
the public of a valuable trout stream or of a recreational lake should be
recognized as a beneficial use which has existed in the past and which
requires a quantity of water just as does an irrigator. The mere fact that
some public uses require that a quantity of water stay in a stream or a
lake is no evidence that the use of that water is not beneficial and in
the public interest, and is certainly not an indication that there is a surplus of water in the stream or lake available for appropriation. The public use should be included in the inventory and a right recognized as of
the date of the earliest such public use.
ADJUDICATION OR DETERMINATION OF WATER RIGHTS
Many of the frailties and uncertainties in Montana's system of adjudication and judicial administration of water rights have already been
*sIbid.; R.C.M. 1947, § 89-814.
"Witness the numerous law suits dependent upon perishable memories alone; and
witness the extension of time to file under the Groundwater Code, provided by the
1965 legislature. (Laws of Montana 1965, ch. 21.)
'"This work was carried on for several years from funds made available for the
purpose by several successive legislatures.
09 WYO. STAT. § 41-61 (1957).
"Indeed, it is regrettable that the State Engineer's county-by-county Water Resources
Survey omitted such uses.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol27/iss1/1
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pointed out in the preceding discussion. But one fundamental weakness
in the adjudication system was not touched upon. Our system is not
designed to adjudicate streams, or parts of streams, but rather it is
designed to permit two or more appropriators to establish the relative
merits of those appropriations which they put into-issue in a water-rights
suit. 50 Such a suit is not designed to finally determine the allocation and
distribution among appropriators of a distinct quantity or source of water
(i.e., a stream) but rather it is designed to fragment the water supply and
adjudicate parts of it among some of the users without relationship to the
whole body of water which is affected."'
There is no requirement that all who might be interested should be
made parties, nor are there means whereby one can assure that he has
joined all such persons. 52 Those who are not made parties are completely
unaffected by the resulting decree and the administration of that decree
by the court appointed water commissioner.53 They may use water in
defiance of the orders of the water commissioner, and they cannot be
brought into court on charges of contempt, for they are not affected by
54
either the decree or the court's order.
To attempt to control persons who were not included in a decree,
one must bring another water-rights suit against them, joining all of the
parties to the prior water-rights suit, and redetermine all of the relative
priorities and amounts.5 5 But such an additional attempt will give no
assurance that there are not still others who should have been joined and
-R.C.M. 1947, § 89-815; Stone, supra note 42.
5Ibid.; State ex rel. Reeder v. District Court, 100 Mont. 376, 47 P.2d 653 (1935);
State ex rel. Pew v. District Court, 34 Mont. 233, 85 Pac. 525 (1906); State ex reL.
Boston & Montana Con. C. & S. Min. Co. v. District Court, 30 Mont. 96, 75 Pac.
956 (1904). Also to be noted are cases wherein there has already been an adjudication, but by reason of the inclusion of new parties the prior decree is not binding
in the subsequent litigation, e.g., Wills v. Morris, 100 Mont. 514, 50 P.2d 862 (1935);
Sherlock v. Greaves, 106 Mont. 206, 214 P.2d 87 (1937); Cook v. Hudson, 110 Mont.
263, 103 P.2d 137 (1940); Galiger v. McNulty, supra note 24. In State ex rel.
McKnight v. District Court, 111 Mont. 520, 524, 111 P.2d 292 (1941) there had
been three separate decrees, but "since the respective rights of relatrix and of the
plaintiff have not been adjudicated as against each other, it is apparent that
relatrix's rights cannot, in a summary proceeding of the nature in question, be subordinated to those of the plaintiff." That meant that there had to be still another
adjudication, joining all of the parties in an additional lawsuit, in order to once
again determine their relative priorities and administer their water uses.
'-See note 51 supra.
"Ibid.
'State ex rel. Beeder v. District Court, supra note 51; State ex rel. Pew v. District
Court, supra note 51; State ex rel. Boston, etc. v. District Court, supra note 51; State
ex tel. MoKnight v. District Court, supra note 51.
'-Ibid.; Sloan v. Byers, 37 Mont. 503, 97 Pac. 855 (1908); Bennett v. Quinlan, 47
Mont. 247, 131 Pac. 1067 (1913); State ex rel. Swanson v. District Court, 107 Mont.
203, 82 P.2d 779 (1938).
Consider this statement by Chief Justice Calloway in Anaconda National Bank v.
Johnson, 75 Mont. 401, 410, 244 Pac. 141, 144 (1926):
Experience has shown that after the rights of the parties taking water from a
stream had been adjudicated, a subsequent appropriator would appear upon the scene,
tap the stream and ruthlessly take the water, disregarding the decreed rights and.
flaunting [sic] the orders of the commissioner appointed by the court to distribute
the water according to the terms of the decree. The only remedy the prior appropriators
had was to commence a suit against the new appropriator, the result being that all of
the rights of the stream had again to be adjudicated; and after that decree was entered
if another subsequent appropriator took the water the same process had to be one
over again.
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who may make similar trouble in the future ;56 nor is there assurance that
those who are parties to the suit have asserted all of their claims.5 7 Nor
does such a proceeding affect a person who was not joined because he
apparently had no water right, but who later claims that he did have
one. These results occur because the courts do not adjudicate streams as
such.
Such a cumbersome and ineffectual system of adjudication will ultimately fall of its own weaknesses, as it has almost done during periods
,f water shortages. 5 The solution is an administrative finding of priorities, as discussed above, providing for notices to all persons within a
practicable administrative unit of a stream system, publication of the
notices, opportunity to object and be heard, and to appeal to the courts
by alleging that there is no substantial evidence to support the findings
of the administrator. Future appropriations should be added to existing
findings of priorities and amounts only with the approval of the administrator, who represents the public and also guards the local interests in
the fair administration of the stream system.5 9
ADMINISTRATION
With respect to the surface waters of Montana, there is no provision
for any organized or orderly administration of water rights unless there
has been litigation between water users.60 Until there has been a law
suit, the appropriators take care of themselves, and take such water as
each believes he is entitled. On many streams this is undoubtedly satisfactory. No administrative system should require the employment of a
water master where one is not needed.
Many streams in Montana do require authoritative administration of
their waters during the irrigation season, or during dry years. Unfortunately there is no simple means whereby the water users can obtain this
service. The situation must become so vexed, so critical, and so bitter that
a water-rights suit is commenced. In effect, there must be a breakdown
in the community of water users along the source of supply, before assistance can be obtained.6 1 Such a requirement is not in the interest of the
water users nor of the public. Easier access to authoritative administration of the source of supply should be provided.
After there has been a breakdown and a water-rights suit among the
5Ibid.
5Sloan v. Byers, 37 Mont. 503, 97 Pac. 855 (1908); Stone, supra note 42, at 23-24.
1The early thirties were dry years (1930-39), and resulted in over twice as many cases
being taken to the Montana Supreme Court than did the period from 1945 to 1957.
(Determined by counting cases cited in West Publishing Company's Pacific Digest).
"See discussion under "Acquisition of A Water Right" above.
0'The only agency which can control or regulate water uses and protect prior rights,
is the judiciary, i.e., the district judge. In order for a person to obtain such aid,
he must be under the jurisdiction of the district judge: he must be in a law suit.
Normally that will be under R.C.M. 1947, § 89-815. After the relative water rights
have been decreed, the litigants may have a water commissioner appointed by the
district judge, to administer the decree, under R.C.M. 1947, § 89-1001.
'See discussion, note 60 upra.
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appropriators, a water commissioner may be appointed by the district
judge to supervise the use of waters by the parties to the law suit.6 2 As
previously pointed out in connection with "adjudication," the water commissioner cannot be placed in charge of the stream itself, for the stream
is not adjudicated. He is only authorized to supervise the taking of
63
water, under the decree, by those parties who engaged in the law suit.
Legislation is needed to permit complete adjudication of a source of sup64
ply, and then complete administration of it by a water commissioner.
Local water commissioners are needed on many streams during the
dry part of the irrigation season, or during dry years, and it is well that
our laws provide for them. But they should not be under the supervision
of the district judges because the water users are required to engage in
a water-rights suit in order to avail themselves of a district judge and
thus obtain a water commissioner.6 4
Such a system involves too much legal procedure, and is very cuinbersome and expensive. A district judge's position is essentially judicial
rather than administrative. In so far as is practical, his job should remain
judicial. and he should be evaluated primarily upon his qualifications for
the judicial task rather than upon his administrative capabilities. Another, and very important reason, is that district judges are already fully
employed and cannot properly assume and handle the very burdensome
additional job of administering water rights in an irrigation district
during dry periods of the irrigation season. Consider this protest by one
able district judge in such a district:
The ultimate 'work horse' of all enforcement and supervision of
all decreed water and appropriated water is the District Judge. The
burden of the minutiae of this task is impossible to appreciate. If it
is a judicial district in which much water must be controlled and ad"Ibid.; R.C.M. 1947, § 89-1001.
'See text at "Adjudication Or Determination Of Water Rights" supra, particularly
notes 51 and 55 thereunder. Illustrative of the point being made here, is the case of
Allen v. Wampler, 143 Mont. 486, 392 P.2d 82 (1964). A 1938 decree provided for
amounts and priorities of water rights, and further, it directed which ditches the
water should be carried in. In 1959 the respondents changed their point of diversion
and switched from their assigned ditch to the ditch in which complainants had a
2/llths interest. The water commissioner and 9/liths of the owners of the latter
ditch approved the change. So did the district court, which found that respondents
were not trespassers because they had permission from some of the tenants in common
of the ditch; the ditch had adequate capacity; and there was no harm to the complainants. But the action had been brought under R.C.M. 1947, § 89-1015, complainant asserting that the commissioner was not properly complying with the 1938
decree. The Montana Supreme Court held that this statute did not authorize the
adjudication of either water rights or ditch rights. So there is no summary proceeding available to the parties. They must once again go through a full scale law suit
to readjudicate rights in the ditches.
"'Montana water-rights suits have been erroneously referred to as essentially 'quiet
title" actions in Sain v. Montana Power Co., 84 F.2d 126, 127 (9th Cir. 1936);
State ex rel. Reeder v. District Court, 100 Mont. 376, 47 P.2d 653 (1935) ; Whitcomb
v. Murphy, 94 Mont. 562, 566, 23 P.2d 980, 981 (1933); and Patten, Water Rights
in Montana, 23 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 162, 169, 170 (1950). But as has been pointed
out, a water-rights suit does not adjudicate a stream, nor attempt to allocate a
source of water. ("Adjudication Or Determination Of Water Rights" supra.) It is
not comparable to the familiar real property "quiet title" actions, authorized under
R.C.M. 1947, title 93, ch. 62. To put it more legalistically, a water-rights suit is in
personam with permissive joinder, rather than in rein. See Stone, supra note 42.
'Note 60 supra.
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measured the working season is from June to September. The judge
must know intimately all decrees, keep abreast of the transfers so
that his first knowledge is workable. Know competent persons to appoint as water commissioners. Understand and know the precise locations of hundreds of ditches, diversion points and storage areas.
Understand the duty of water, how to measure it, and know background of water users. The judge must expect to be called at all
hours of the day and night by water users, water commissioners and
ditch riders. He scans the skies at the springtide, checks the water
table, for he knows if it is a dry year his task will be increased
'ten fold.'
It is no answer to say that he may appoint water commissioners,
for he is the ultimate authority for both the water users and the
water commissioner-and he is easily reached. 66

The supervision of water commissioners or water masters should be
placed under an administrator at the state level, as is presently the case
in Montana under the Groundwater Code.6 7 In fact, this aspect of the
Groundwater Code68 should be broadened, so that groundwater supervisors may be used to supervise the distribution of surface waters in
areas where and at times when such administration is needed.
The Groundwater Code permits either the administrator or a group of
water users to have a source of supply designated a "controlled groundwater area," upon showing facts which demonstrate the need for administering withdrawals.6 9 Thereafter, the administrator may limit with70
drawals of groundwater, following provisions for notices and a hearing,
and he may appoint groundwater supervisors as needed, to assist the
71
administration.
The framework for the administration of groundwater should be
continued and broadened so as to make it available to surface water users
also. Administrative determinations arrived at by fair procedures can be
obtained before there is a breakdown in the community of water users.
The proceedings need not be so much of the adversary type as the typical
water-rights suit, and the saving in time, technicalities, bitterness and
money will be great. The code should provide for appeals to the courts
which may result in reversals of administrative determinations in those
cases in which there is no substantial evidence to support the

administrator.

72

GROUNDWATER
Groundwaters and surface waters are simply waters that are in different stages of a single hydrologic cycle. 78 Surface waters seep into the
"District Judge W. W. Lessley, in a paper deliv red at the Third Annual Water
Resources Conference, Aug. 1 and 2, 1958.

-R.C.M. 1947, § 89-2932.
OSee discussion under "Groundwater"

infra.

-R.C.M. 1947, § 89-2914.
-R.C.M. 1947, §§ 89-2914, 89-2919.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 89-2932.

"The Groundwater Code should be strengthened in this respect. (R.C.M. 1947, §§ 892920--89-2923.)

"McGuInsS,

WATER LAw WITH SPECIAL RFEENCE To GROUND WATER 4 (1951);
Swenson, Montana's Ground Water Resources and Problems of Their Use and

Development, Proceedings of Fourth Annual Water Resources Conference, Montana
School of Mines Information Circular 26, p. 4, Dec. 1958.
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ground and are then called groundwater, while groundwaters seep out to
the surface and become surface water. Consequently the depletion of one
of these sources can affect the other, and when that occurs it is desirable
to integrate their administration.
But groundwaters and surface waters also have distinct and different
characteristics, which require recognition if each is to be administered
effectively. Surface water is characterized by rapid, free movement, and
annual replenishment. Overuse has immediate results but it does not
damage the resource which is replenished annually. Groundwater, however, sometimes moves with glacial slowness. The supply is frequently
the result of decades of accumulation, and although the resource may be
overused for a period of years without depletion, when it is exhausted the
74
effect is long lasting.
Because of their distinct characteristics, it will usually be most
practical to treat groundwater and surface water as separate sources,
separately administered. In adjudications or in administrative determinations of existing rights, it will usually be administratively convenient
to combine surface appropriators from a given stream or part of a stream
in one proceeding, and the users of a groundwater area in another. New
appropriations will be designated as either groundwater or surface water
appropriations, and usually will involve only the other similar appropriators. And a water commissioner, master or supervisor will generally
administer surface water appropriations in relation to one another according to the annual run-off in the drainage area, while at the same time
he is separately administering a controlled groundwater area on a basis
such as its average annual rate of recharge.
Because of the interrelationship of surface water and groundwater
there will be instances in which they should be administered conjunctively
because one of the sources is being significantly affected by management
practices in the other. As our water resources become more intensively
used, these instances will gradually become more common. But for the
time being, conjunctive administration should be initiated by the person
or persons who claim that their prior rights are being harmed by the
management practices which are alleged to be the cause, and they should
have the burden of showing the cause and effect.
Although for the time being, at least, the two sources will generally
be administered as separate entities, in the interest of efficiency and
economy there should not be a duplication of personnel or basic procedures. The same procedures can be used for the acquisition, determination
and day to day administration of rights. Since our Groundwater Code
provides a much better framework than do our surface water laws, it
should be used as the basis for improving both aspects of our water laws.
ABANDONMENT
Montana's surface water laws provide that when an appropriator
"Groff, A Summary Report on the Groundwater

Situation in Montana, Montana
Dec. 1958.
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abandons and ceases to use the water for the purpose for which he appropriated it, the right ceases; but questions of abandonment are questions of fact. 75 The judicial construction of this provision has never

directly implemented the limitations of use to the initial purpose of the
appropriation, 76 but has required as proof of abandonment that the user
ceased using the water with a present intention to never make any further
use of it. 77 It has been virtually impossible to prove an actual intent to
never make further use of a water right, and consequently for practical
purposes there is no effective law of abandonment in Montana. 78 A long
unused water right therefore remains as a permanent threat, and a severe
inhibition to future development of the source of supply.
In considering abandonment, one should realize that the original
appropriations were often inflated, and claimed more water than was
needed for the beneficial use installed. As expressed by Chief Justice
Callaway in 1924:
In Montana, as elsewhere, when the early settlers made their
original appropriations they had little knowledge of the quantity of
water necessary to irrigate their lands to good advantage. Ample
quantities of water being available in the streams the settlers claimed
extravagant amounts ....
Almost every irrigator used an excessive
amount of water, some all they could get. Some actually washed the
seed out of the ground. -.

.

It is a matter of common knowledge in the several judicial districts of this state where irrigation has been practiced since the early
days that extravagant quantities of water were awarded the litigants
by the courts. In instances more water was awarded than some of the
ditches of the litigants ever would carry; in others much greater
quantities of water than the litigants ever did or could use beneficially .... In water suits in which members of this court have been
engaged the trial judges have been confronted with aged witnesses
who testified to what took place in early days. These venerable men,
having more or less knowledge of what they testified about, frequently looked through mental magnifying-glasses in attempting to
recall forgotten things from bygone days. The difficulty encountered
in attempting to do equal and exact justice upon testimony of this
character is always great and sometimes insuperable.
As a result of erroneous decrees awarding excessive quantities
of water much water which should be available to subsequent appropriators has been denied them....
One should not be permitted to play the dog in the manger with
water he does not or cannot use for a beneficial purpose when other
lands are crying for water. It is to the interest of the public that
every acre of land in this state susceptible to irrigation shall be irrigated. It is the writer's opinion that the legislature should enact a
statute to the effect that, where one has not-made -a-beneficial use
of the whole or some part of the water claimed by or decreed to him,
for a specified number of years, the part so unused shall be deemed
abandoned prima facie. There might well be included a section providing that one who sells a part of his right because the land he owns
and for which the water was appropriated does not require that sur-5R.C.M. 1947, § 89-802.

7

Although the Montana Supreme Court took a step in the direction of such a restriction in Alder Gulch Con. Min. Co. v. Hayes, supra note 31, nevertheless our code
appears to authorize changes in the purpose of an appropriation without loss of
priority. (R.C.M. 1947, § 89-803.)
'Meagher v. Hardenbrook, 11 Mont. 385, 28 Pac. 648 (1891) ; Tucker v. Jones, 8 Mont.
225, 19 Pac. 571 (1888); McCauley v. McKieg, 8 Mont. 389, 21 Pac. 22 (1889).
See discussion of Montana's law of abandonment in Stone, supra note 42, at 26, n. 31.
"Ibid.
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plus shall by the act of selling be held to have abandoned the part
sold, the purchaser taking the right as of the date of purchase. .... 79

The foregoing statement by Chief Justice Callaway concerning the need
for an abandonment' law, and the nature of the law needed, can scarcely
be improved upon.
It should be pointed out, moreover, that the lack of an abandonment
law has led our courts to reach a result similar to abandonment, but

without so stating. Thus, excessive appropriations have been reduced;80
purchasers of water rights have been limited to whatever demands upon
the water their sellers would make ;"' and even decreed rights have been
re-examined to redetermine what the actual need was at the time of the
original decree.8 2 Such efforts to administer water rights equitably are

are commendable, but since they are without clear and understandable
statutory expression, they result in further uncertainty and insecurity

in our water rights law. A clear, effective abandonment law would be
more fair to the user, the public, existing appropriators and future

developers.
PRESCRIPTION
Montana's law of prescription is almost as useless and ineffective as
the law of abandonment. One claiming a right by prescription must show
that he used another person's water at a time when the other person
wanted and needed that water. That is almost impossible to prove.8 3
But rather than strengthening this doctrine in order to make it more
frequently useful and effective, the doctrine should be abolished. Water
rights should be acquired in an orderly manner, of record, with other
local interests and the public interests represented. Prescription satisfies
none of these requirements.
CONCLUSION
These and other problems arising out of Montana's water laws are
receiving attention. The Montana University Joint WATER RESOURCES
"Allen v. Petrick, 69 Mont. 373, 377-379, 222 Pac. 451, 452-453 (1924).
8Ibid.; Conrow v. Huffine, 48 Mont. 437, 138 Pac. 1094 (1914); Peck v. Simon, 101
Mont. 12, 52 P.2d 164 (1935); Galiger v. McNulty, 80 Mont. 339, 260 Pac. 401
(1927); Power v. Switzer, 21 Mont. 523, 55 Pac. 32 (1898).
"E.g., Conrow v. Huffine, supra note 80; Allen v. Petrick, supra note 79; Creek v.
Bozeman Water Works Co., 15 Mont. 121, 38 Pae. 459 (1894); Spokane Ranch &
Water Co. v. Beatty, 37 Mont. 342, 96 Pae. 727 (1908); Peck v. Simon, supra note
80; Galiger v. McNulty, supra note 80; Brennan v. Jones, 101 Mont. 550, 55 P.2d
697 (1931'.).
"Quigley v. McIntosh, 110 Mont. 495, 103 P.2d 1067 (1940) and cases cited note 81
supra.
"Talbott v. Butte City Water Co., 29 Mont. 17, 73 Pac. 1111 (1903); Norman v.
Corbley, 32 Mont. 195, 79 Pac. 1059 (1905); Smith v. Duff, 39 Mont. 374, 102 Pac.
981 (1909); Featherman v. Hennessy, 42 Mont. 535, 113 Pao. 751 (1911); Boehler
v. Boyer, 72 Mont. 472, 234 Pac. 1086 (1925); Zosel v. Kohrs, 72 Mont. 564, 234
Pac. 1089 (1925); St. Onge v. Blakely, 76 Mont. 1, 245 Pac. 532 (1926); Galiger v.
McNulty, supra note 80; Irion v. Hyde, 107 Mont. 84, 81 P.2d 353 (1937); Woodward
v. Perkins, 116 Mont. 46, 147 P.2d 1016 (1944).
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RESEARCH CENTER is supporting, with federal funds, a project which
will propose a complete overhauling of Montana's water rights laws,
in the form of a drafted recodification. The Montana Legislative Council,
acting pursuant to Senate Joint Resolution No. 13 of the 1965 legislature, is preparing a draft of a Water Conservancy District Act to facilitate the financing and development of multi-purpose projects for the use
of water. These, and other proposals which will arise in the future to
meet other needs, should receive careful but sympathetic study by our
legislature.
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